Online Appendices for "Flexible insurance for informal long-term care: A study of stated preferences

April, 2021

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Online Appendix A Experimental survey questions

		This research study	y is being carried out by the	following researchers:	
		Role	Name	Organisation	
		Chief Investigator	Professor Susan Thorp	UNSW Australia The University of Sydney	
		Co-Investigator/s	Mr Shang Wu	UNSW Australia UNSW Australia	
		Research Funder	This research is being fund	ed by ARC Grant DP1093842	
	research about? ted to take part in this onlin	ne research study. Ye	ou have been invited becaus	se you fulfil the relevant survey	parameters of being age 18 or o
	he research study is to inv ce their daily living and ag		financial decisions and aged	care arrangements in retireme	ent. We hope to learn more about
This Particip	o take part in this researce ant Information Statement want to take part in the re	tells you about the r	esearch study. It explains th	e research tasks involved. Kno	owing what is involved will help yo
Please read	this information carefully.	Before deciding whe	ther or not to take part, you	might want to talk about it with	a relative or friend.
	in this research is volunta ersity of Sydney.	ry. If you don't wish t	to take part, you don't have t	to. Your decision will not affect	your relationship with UNSW Au
If you decide	to take part in the resear out the allocation of your r	ch study, you will be		questionnaire which will ask y	ou to make hypothetical financial characteristics. We expect this a
	d to participate in this po paid around 400 Market po		this survey. You also have th	ne opportunity to earn bonus p	oints.
	e possible benefits to pa use the research findings		er ways to help people with th	heir long term retirement plann	ing.
By clicking of	appen to information abo n the 'I agree' button you ill keep your data for 10 ye	consent to the resea	rch team collecting and using	g information from the question	nnaire you complete for the resea
					publication and/or presentation, ly identifiable in these publication
	d on a host server that is u				conses you provide to the questio collected in the questionnaire so
You have a Team Conta UNSW Scho	ct' detailed below. This fee	bout the overall resu edback will be in the lies website at <u>http://</u>	Its of this study. You can tell form of a working paper sum	nmarising key results, available	edback by contacting the 'Resear e on the 'Working papers' page of esearch/publications. You will rec
Submitting y have submit		ire is an indication of			your responses any time before e anonymous and therefore we w
The person	you may need to contact w	ill depend on the na			terning this project or if you have rch team:
Research T	eam Contact				
Name	Hazel Batemen				
	Professor, School of Risk	and Actuarial Studie	s		
l elephone Email	+61 2 9385 3096 h.bateman@unsw.edu.au		-		
What if I ha If you have a Complaints		ncerns about the re aspect of the project,	→ esearch study? the way it is being conducte	ed, then you may contact:	
Position		arch Ethics Coordina	ator		
Telephone	+61 2 9385 6				
Email		@unsw.edu.au			
HC Referen	nce Number HC15273				
Please click	">>" to continue.				

The purpose of this survey is to learn more about what matters most to people when think	ing about financing aged care in later life.
Please note that due to the nature of this survey you will be asked questions about your pe participate in this survey, you MUST answer these questions as we need your answers to questions are confidential, and cannot be used to identify you personally.	
Declaration by the participant	
□ I have read the Participant Information Sheet;	
I understand the purposes, study tasks and risks of the research described in the pr	oject;
□ I have had an opportunity to ask questions and I am satisfied with the answers I have	ve received;
I freely agree to participate in this research study as described and understand that	I am free to withdraw at any time during the project and
withdrawal will not affect my relationship with any of the named organisations and/or	r research team members.
O I do not wish to participate	
<	
ntroduction	
hank you for agreeing to participate in this survey about personal financial decisions and	aged and health care in retirement
	aged and near are in reactinent.
he survey will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes to complete.	
Yease take as much time as you need to answer the questions. Most questions only requinonymous – that is no one involved in this study can identify you personally, no one will of our answers will be used for academic purposes only.	
This study is being conducted by researchers at UNSW Australia and the University of Syunaage their aged care costs in later life. This is not a policy proposal from the government esearchers to suggest ways to develop financial products to help you and other Australia	nt. However, your answers might be used by the academic
The survey begins with a few simple questions about you. Please DO NOT USE the "back he bottom of each screen. If you would like to pause the survey to return to it later, simply vill return you to the last point of entry in the survey.	
Please click ">>" to continue.	
	•
<<	~
/hat is your age?	
re you?	
O Male	
○ Female	
	.

Demographics

In this section of the survey, we will collect some demographic information about you.

Cultural background

Where were you born?

- Australia
- O New Zealand
- O United Kingdom, Channel Islands, Isle of Man
- O North-West Europe (excl. United Kingdom, Chanel Islands, Isle of Man)
- O Mediterranean countries
- O Eastern Europe
- O China
- \bigcirc India
- Asian country other than China and India
- O Other (Please specify)

Marital status

What is your current marital status?

- $\bigcirc\,$ Never married and not living in a long term (de facto) relationship
- ⊖ Widowed
- O Divorced
- Separated but not divorced
- Married
- Living in long term relationship (de facto)

Which of the following describes your family structure?


- O Living alone
- $\bigcirc\,$ Living with husband/wife or a long term partner without children


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- $\bigcirc\,$ Living with husband/wife or a long term partner with children
- O Living with children (one parent family)
- Living with a relative or friend
- Other than the above

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	out you	ır health.						
as a doctor ever told you that you have dement	ia?							
⊖ Yes								
O No								
oes anyone ever help you with the following:								
	Yes	No						
Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks	0	0						
Bathing or taking a shower	0	0						
Eating, such as cutting up your food	0	0						
Getting in or out of bed	0	0						
Using the toilet, including getting up and down	Õ	0						
comg are const, mersang getang ap and com	\sim	\smile						
ease answer the following questions regarding	eomo	maior illn	00000					
ease answer the following questions regarding	some	major min						
				Yes	No			
Has a doctor ever told you that you have had a h	neart att	ack, coron	ary heart disease,	0	0			
angina, congestive heart failure, or other heart p	roblems	?			0			
Has a doctor ever told you that you have diabete	es or hig	jh blood su	igar?	0	0			
Has a doctor ever told you that you have chronic	: luna di	sease suc	h as chronic					
Has a doctor ever told you that you have chronic bronchitis or emphysema?	: lung di	sease suc	h as chronic	0	0			
bronchitis or emphysema?	-	sease suc	h as chronic					
bronchitis or emphysema? Has a doctor ever told you that you have had a s ould you say your health is excellent, very goo	stroke?			0	0			
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bronchitis or emphysema? Has a doctor ever told you that you have had a s could you say your health is excellent, very good Excellent Very good Good Fair Poor	d, good	l, fair, or p						>>





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The three retirement income pro	duct options are:
	ts every year for the rest of your life . For every \$1,000 premium you pay now (one-off payment), you will ch year for the rest of your life. If you die, the payments stop and no money will be paid to your estate.
	I need aged care. For every \$1,000 premium you pay now (one-off payment), you will receive payments of ime you have either (or both) of the following health conditions:
 You are diagnosed with dementia. You need help completing at least t 	wo of the following activities: (i) eating, (ii) bathing, (iii) dressing, (iv) toileting, and (v) getting in or out of bed.
you die, the payments stop and no mone	y will be paid to your estate.
Account-Based Pension Product: This product is an investment account whe haid to your estate.	re you can deposit your retirement savings and withdraw as and when needed. If you die, any balance will be
or all three products:	
 Assume you do not have to pay any 	n top of the Age Pension you receive from the government and does not affect the amount of Age Pension. • tax. default so you are guaranteed to be paid if you qualify.
	You can click ">>" to continue in 58 seconds
~	
Some hypothetical scenarios	
Ve are now going to present you with a sen ne various retirement income product option	ries of hypothetical scenarios and ask you to make decisions about the allocation of your retirement savings to ons we have shown you.
f you need any information about the three ver the blue text and a summary table of a	e products (Lifetime Annual Income, Aged Care Income, Account-Based Pension Product), just hover your mou Ill three will pop up).
noring your own financial circumstances	for the moment, we want you to imagine you
 Are 65 years old, Are about to retire, Own your own home. 	

You can click ">>" to continue in 29 seconds

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Javan your mayoo avan the blue toot for more information these	
lover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products.	
n this first scenario, you have:	
 Basic retirement income of \$22,000 per annum (CPI-indexed). This is from the Age Pension. Retirement savings of \$175,000 	
he decision you have to make is as follows:	
How much Aged Care Income (if any) do you want to buy?	
The balance of your retirement savings after buying the Aged Care Income will go into an Account-Based Pens income (of \$22,000 per annum CPI-indexed) is not affected by your choice.	ion Product. Your basic retirement
Jsing the slider below, show how much Aged Care Income you would like to receive each year in the future, in	the event that you qualify.
	Aged care income
\$0	\$175,000 Maximum
You can position the slider anywhere on the line, but you need to move it at least once before you can continue.	
he outcomes of your choice are summarised as follows:	
. Basic retirement income: \$22,000	
Aged Care Income paid only if you suffer from either (or both) of the health conditions 1) or 2): \$0	
Account-Based Pension balance: \$175,000	
Scenario 2 - How much Aged Care Income would you prefer?	
Scenario 2 - How much Aged Care Income would you prefer?	
	his scenario, suppose you have purchase
lover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products. In the previous scenario, you had basic retirement income of \$22,000, which is made up of Age Pension only. In t	
lover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products. In the previous scenario, you had basic retirement income of \$22,000, which is made up of Age Pension only. In th 3,300 Lifetime Annual Income using your retirement savings of \$43,750. As a result, you now have: • Basic retirement income of \$25,300 per annum (CPI-indexed). This is made up of Age Pension (\$22,00	
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In the first state of the state	
Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on th	
In this scenario, suppose you have purchased \$6,600 Lifetime	25,300, which is made up of Age Pension (\$22,000) and Lifetime Annual Income (\$3,300). Annual Income using your retirement savings of \$87,500. As a result, you now have:
 Basic retirement income of \$28,600 per annum (CPI- Retirement savings of \$87,500 	indexed). This is made up of Age Pension (\$22,000) and Lifetime Annual Income (\$6,600)
The decision you have to make is as follows:	
How much Aged Care Income (if any) do you want to	o buy?
The balance of your retirement savings after buying the Aged (ncome (of \$28,600 per annum CPI-indexed) is not affected by	Care Income will go into an Account-Based Pension Product. Your basic retirement your choice.
Using the slider below, show how much Aged Care Income yo	ou would like to receive each year in the future, in the event that you qualify.
	Aged care income
\$0	\$87,500 Maximum
	ario (If your previous choice is greater than the maximum amount of aged care income you m). You can position the slider anywhere on the line, but you need to move it at least once
The outcomes of your choice are summarised as follows:	
I. Basic retirement income: \$28,600	
2. Aged Care Income paid only if you suffer from either (or bot	h) of the health conditions 1) or 2): \$0
3. Account-Based Pension balance: \$87,500	
Scenario 4 - How much Aged Care Income woul	d you prefer?
Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on the new scenario, you had basic retirement income of \$2	ese products.
Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on the n the previous scenario, you had basic retirement income of \$2 n this scenario, suppose you have purchased \$9,800 Lifetime	ese products. 28,600, which is made up of Age Pension (\$22,000) and Lifetime Annual Income (\$6,600). Annual Income using your retirement savings of \$131,250. As a result, you now have:
Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on the n the previous scenario, you had basic retirement income of \$2 n this scenario, suppose you have purchased \$9,800 Lifetime • Basic retirement income of \$31,800 per annum (CPI- • Retirement savings of \$43,750	ese products. 28,600, which is made up of Age Pension (\$22,000) and Lifetime Annual Income (\$6,600). Annual Income using your retirement savings of \$131,250. As a result, you now have:
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Aged Care Income and an Account-Based Pension product for different levels of basic retirement income. In the ne to choose between different combinations of basic retirement income, Aged Care Income and Account-Based Pens Please click ">>" to continue.	
<	>>
Scenario 5: Retirement income product combinations	
Columns A, B and C represent combinations of retirement income products. They are equal in total value, and would of \$175,000.	be funded from your retirement savings
Which of the following three combinations A, B or C, would be best for you? Which would be worst?	

Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products.

	Α	В	С
Your annual basic retirement income (Age Pension plus Lifetime Annual Income)	\$25,300	\$28,600	\$31,800
Your annual Aged Care Income if you suffer from either (or both) health conditions 1) or 2)	\$24,950	\$37,650	\$10,950
Your Account-Based Pension balance	\$ 106,300	\$49,850	\$32,800
Which of A, B or C would be BEST for you:	0	0	0
Which of A, B or C would be WORST for you:	0	0	0

<<

Scenario 6: Retirement income product combinations

Here are another three combinations. They are equal in total value, and would be funded from your retirement savings of \$175,000.

Which of the following three combinations A, B or C, would be best for you? Which would be worst?

Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products.

	Α	В	С
Your annual basic retirement income (Age Pension plus Lifetime Annual Income)	\$25,300	\$22,000	\$35,125
Your annual Aged Care Income if you suffer from either (or both) health conditions 1) or 2)	\$24,950	\$38,500	\$0
Your Account-Based Pension balance	\$106,300	\$136,500	\$0
Which of A, B or C would be BEST for you:	0	0	0
Which of A, B or C would be WORST for you:	0	0	0

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Scenario 7: Retirement income product combinations

In the last question we noticed that you prefer combination **A**. Now suppose that the **Aged Care Income** product was not available as an option. Please consider the three new combinations below. They are equal in total value, and would be funded from your retirement savings of \$175,000. Which of the following three combinations A, B or C would be best for you? Which would be worst?

Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products.

	Α	В	С
Your annual basic retirement income (Age Pension plus Lifetime Annual Income)	\$25,300	\$28,563	\$22,000
Your Account-Based Pension balance	\$131,250	\$87,500	\$175,000
Which of would be BEST for you?	0	0	0
Which of A, B or C would be WORST for you?	0	0	0

<<

Scenario 8: Financing Aged Care Income product

In the last scenario, you made the following choice:

Basic retirement income of \$28,563 per annum (Age Pension plus Lifetime Annual Income)
 Account-Based Pension balance of \$87,500

If you were to buy the Age Care Income product, you could finance this either by reducing your Lifetime Annual Income and/or by reducing your Account-Based Pension balance.

Columns A, B and C represent the three possible ways to finance your Aged Care Income product. The total costs are equal in total value. Which of the following three options in columns A, B or C, would be best for you? Which would be worst?

Hover your mouse over the blue text for more information on these products.

	A - reducing Lifetime Annual Income	B - reducing both Lifetime Annual Income and Account- Based Pension balance	C - reducing Account-Based Pension product
Your annual basic retirement income (Age Pension plus Lifetime Annual Income)	Decrease ()	Decrease (-)	Keep the same
Your Account-Based Pension balance	Keep the same	Decrease (-)	Decrease ()
Explanation	For each \$1,000 increase in Age Care Income each year, you reduce your Lifetime Annual Income by each year	For each \$1,000 increase in Age Care Income each year, you reduce your Lifetime Annual Income by \$37.50 and your Account-Based Pension balance by \$500	For each \$1,000 increase in Age Care Income each year, you reduce your Account-Based Pension balance by \$1,000
Which of A, B or C would be BEST for you:	0	0	0
Which of A, B or C would be WORST for you:	0	0	0

<<

In the final scenario of this section, we will ask you to choose which type of benefit you would prefer to cover aged care costs.
Please click ">>" to continue.

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you suffer fr your care (fr nts, you need have incur have incur ha	ou would receive are also rom either (or both) of the or example, if the care is ed to pay for the shortfall red. However, you will n dome and the Account-Ba	a health conditions 1) or 2 provided by your family ot receive any payments >>
ed Care Inc Annual me 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	ome and the Account-Ba	sed Pension product?
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Sed Pension product?
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Sed Pension product?
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
Annual me	Aged Care Income	Account-Based Pension product
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Section 2: Financial behaviour

In this section of the survey, we will ask you about your risk attitude, level of patience and when you would like to spend your money.

Risk attitude

1. How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?

Please tick one box on the scale where 0 means 'not prepared to take risks' and 10 means 'fully prepared to take risks'.

Not prepared to take risks										Fully prepared to take risks
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks in *financial matters* or do you try to avoid taking risks in *financial matters*?

Please tick one box on the scale where 0 means 'not prepared to take risks' and 10 means 'fully prepared to take risks'.

Not prepared to task risks										Fully prepared t take risks
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Section 2: Financial behaviour

Patience

3. How do you see yourself: Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great patience?

Please tick one box on the scale where 0 means 'very impatient' and 10 means 'very patient'.


Very impatient										Very patient
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Spending in different health conditions

4. People's general spending behaviour may be different when they are not healthy. How do you see yourself: Are you generally like person A or person B?

Person A: Spend as much as possible while being in good health and spend little while being in bad health.
 Person B: Spend as much as possible while being in bad health and spend little while being in good health

Please tick one box on the scale where 0 means 'Person A' and 10 means 'Person B'.



Section 3: Life expectancy and aged care	
In the following questions we will ask you about life expectancy, health and aged care.	
Subjective longetivity	
According to Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian females at your age on average are expected to live you will live?	to age 90, to what age do you think
Smoking behaviour	
Which of the following best describes your smoking behaviour? (By smoking we mean more than 100 cigar pipes or cigars)	ettes in your lifetime. Do not include
O Ever smoked, currently smoking	
O Ever smoked, currently not smoking	
○ Never smoked	
	>>
Section 3: Life expectancy and aged care	
How many children do you have that are still alive?	
Please count all natural children, fostered, adopted and stepchildren.	
~~	>>
Section 3: Life expectancy and aged care	
Section 5. Life expectancy and aged care	
Think about the inheritance you and your partner might leave (but not including any inheritance you might leave to e	
Including property and other valuables as well as money that you might own, what are the chances that you inheritance totalling \$10,000 or more?	and your partner will leave an
Please select your answer	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

IF NO CHANCE

hink about the inheritance you and yo	partner might leave (but not including any inheritance you might leave to each other).
cluding property and other valuab heritance totalling \$10,000 or more	s as well as money that you might own, what are the chances that you and your partner will leave an
No chance, almost no chance (1 ch	ice in 100) 🗸
nd what are the changes that you	d our partner will leave and inheritance? Include all properties and other valuable items as well as monorties
	d our partner will leave and inheritance? Include all properties and other valuable items as well as mon
	d our partner will leave and inheritance? Include all properties and other valuable items as well as mone
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IF <> NO CHANCE

		ritance you might leave to each other).	
cluding property and other valuables as heritance totalling \$10,000 or more?	well as money that you might own, wha	t are the chances that you and your partner will leave	an
Very slight possibility (1 chance in 10)	~		
nd what are the chances that you and yo ems as well as money here.	ur partner will leave an inheritance total	ly \$100,000 or more? Include properties and other values are strained at the second	laple
Please select your answer	~		

Exposure to care and health insurance	
In the last five years, have you ever receiv you?	ved assistance or services provided by any medically-trained person who came to your home to help
⊖ Yes	
O No	
In the last five years, have your parents, s person who came to their home to help th	siblings or other close relatives ever received assistance or services provided by any medically-trained nem?
⊖ Yes	
⊖ No	
O Don't know	
Did you look after any sick or disabled ad (By 'look after' we mean the active provisi	lult in the past week (including your partner or other people in your household)? ion of care)
⊖ Yes	
⊖ No	
Not including Medicare, are you covered I	by any private health insurance plan, whether in your own name or through another family member?
○ Yes, in own name	
 Yes, through another family member 	
 No, not insured 	
<<	>>>
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag	
	jed care
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged ca When getting older, you may need help w	jed care
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged ca When getting older, you may need help w	jed care are planning rith daily living activities (eg, bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domestic tasks (eg, shopping,
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged ca When getting older, you may need help w gardening, cleaning, cooking). Have you g	jed care are planning rith daily living activities (eg, bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domestic tasks (eg, shopping,
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged care When getting older, you may need help w gardening, cleaning, cooking). Have you g Yes No	jed care are planning rith daily living activities (eg, bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domestic tasks (eg, shopping,
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged care When getting older, you may need help w gardening, cleaning, cooking). Have you g Yes No	ged care are planning rith daily living activities (eg, bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domestic tasks (eg, shopping, given a thought about who will provide care or support for you before you participated in this survey?
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged car When getting older, you may need help w gardening, cleaning, cooking). Have you g Yes No Have you given a thought about how you	ged care are planning rith daily living activities (eg, bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domestic tasks (eg, shopping, given a thought about who will provide care or support for you before you participated in this survey?
Section 3: Life expectancy and ag Potential to receive aged care and aged car When getting older, you may need help w gardening, cleaning, cooking). Have you g Yes No Have you given a thought about how you Yes	Jed care Fare planning with daily living activities (eg, bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domestic tasks (eg, shopping, given a thought about who will provide care or support for you before you participated in this survey?

Section 3: Life expectancy and aged car	re	
	i v	
	- () - ()	dia daraka (a. a. a. karanina aradanina
r you were to need <u>some</u> help with daily living ac leaning, cooking), who do you expect will provid	ctivities (e.g., bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or domes ide that help?	stic tasks (e.g., shopping, gardening,
select all that apply.		
Spouse/partner		
Children/extended family		
Friends and neighbours		
An aged care provider, in my home		
An aged care provider, in residential care		
Personal carers/gardeners/cleaners etc. that I	I hire myself	
Other (Please specify)		
you were to need extensive bein with daily livin	ng activities (e.g., bathing, dressing, feeding) and/or do	mestic tasks (e.g., shonning, gardening
leaning, cooking), who do you expect will provide		mesue tasks (e.g., snopping, guruening,
elect all that apply.		
Spouse/partner		
Children/extended family		
Friends and neighbours		
An aged care provider, in my home		
An aged care provider, in residential care		
Personal carers/gardeners/cleaners etc. that I	I hire myself	
Other (Please specify)		
/hich of the following statements best describe:	s your thoughts about financing your aged care expension	ses?
	- ,	
$\bigcirc~$ I've made sure I've got enough money/assets t	to pay for care when I need it	
$\bigcirc\$ I will need some help from my family to pay for	or my aged care costs	
○ I will need some help from the government to p	pay for my aged care costs	
○ I expect the government to pay all my aged ca	are costs	
0.0 h 1 h 1 h 1		
 Can't say - don't know what aged care services 	es I may need or how much they will cost	
 Can't say - don't know what aged care service: 	es I may need or how much they will cost	
 Can't say - don't know what aged care service: 	I may need or how much they will cost	
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< as a doctor ever told you that you have demention of the second sec	tia?	
as a doctor ever told you that you have dementil Yes No Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks Bathing or taking a shower Eating, such as cutting up your food Getting in or out of bed Using the toilet, including getting up and down ave you seen these questions previously in this Yes	tia?	
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< as a doctor ever told you that you have demention of the second sec	tia?	
< as a doctor ever told you that you have demention of the second sec	tia?	

Section 4: Personal characteristics

In this final section of the survey, we will collect some socio-economic information about you

Education

What is the highest level of school you have completed?

- Year 12 or equivalent
- Year 11 or equivalent
- Year 10 or equivalent
- Year 9 or equivalent
- Year 8 or equivalent
- Year 7 or equivalent
- Year 6 or below
- O Did not go to school

What is the highest post school qualification you have?

O PhD

- O Master Degree or equivalent
- O Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate from university or equivalent

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- O Bachelor Degree or equivalent
- O Advanced Diploma and Diploma from university/TAFE or equivalent
- O Certificate or equivalent from TAFE or equivalent
- None of the above

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Section 4: Personal characteristics

Work status

Which of the following best describes your current work status?

$\bigcirc\,$ Employed full time

- $\bigcirc\,$ Employed part time
- \bigcirc Unemployed
- O Not in the labour force Stay-at-home parent or caregiver
- O Not in the labour force Full-time student
- O Not in the labour force Retired
- O Not in the labour force Other

Income

Which of the following categories best describes your weekly (annual) gross personal income (before tax)?

- Negative income
- O Nil income
- \$1-\$199 (\$1-\$10,399)
- \$200-\$299 (\$10,400-\$15,599)
- \$300-\$399 (\$15,600-\$20,799)
- \$400-\$599 (\$20,800-\$31,199)
- \$600-\$799 (\$31,200-\$41,599)
- \$800-\$999 (\$41,600-\$51,999)
- \$1,000-\$1,249 (\$52,000-\$64,999)
- \$1,250-\$1,499 (\$65,000-\$77,999)
- \$1,500-\$1,999 (\$78,000-\$103,999)
- \$2,000 or more (\$104,000 or more)

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Section 4: Personal characteristics

Which of the following categories best describes your weekly (annual) gross household income (before tax)?

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- Negative income
- O Nil income
- \$300-\$399 (\$15,600-\$20,799)
- \$400-\$599 (\$20,800-\$31,199)
- \$600-\$799 (\$31,200-\$41,599)
- \$800-\$999 (\$41,600-\$51,999)
- \$1,000-\$1,249 (\$52,000-\$64,999)
- \$1,250-\$1,499 (\$65,000-\$77,999)
- \$1,500-\$1,999 (\$78,000-\$103,999)
- \$2,000-\$2,499 (\$104,000-\$129,999)
- \$2,500-\$2,999 (\$130,000-\$155,999)
- \$3,000-\$3,499 (\$156,000-\$181,999)
- \$3,500-\$3,999 (\$182,000-\$207,999)
- \$4,000-\$4,999 (\$208,000-\$259,999)
- \$5,000 or more (\$260,000 or more)

<<

This section includes qu	uestions to measure your general financial competence. Please answer the questions without using a calculator.
Suppose you had \$10 account if you left the	0 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the money to grow?
O More than \$102	
O Exactly \$102	
O Less than \$102	
○ Do not know	
Imagine that the intere to buy with the money	est rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be abl / in this account?
 More than today 	
 Exactly the same 	
○ Less than today	
O Do not know	
Buying shares in a sir	ngle company usually provides a safer return than buying units in a managed share fund.
⊖ True	
○ False	
O Do not know	
~~	
~	>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Financial Literacy	and Numeracy
Financial Literacy	and Numeracy
Financial Literacy	and Numeracy
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chanc	and Numeracy I a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chance ingle ticket in the lot	and Numeracy I a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times in a lottery, the chance single ticket in the lott Please enter a number	a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy tery?
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chance ingle ticket in the lot	a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy tery?
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chance single ticket in the lot Please enter a number people n a raffle, the chance	e and Numeracy I a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy tery? between 0 to 1000 in the box.
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chance single ticket in the lot Please enter a number people n a raffle, the chance	e and Numeracy I a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy tery? between 0 to 1000 in the box.
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chance single ticket in the lot Please enter a number people n a raffle, the chance	e and Numeracy I a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy tery? between 0 to 1000 in the box.
Financial Literacy magine that we rolled Please enter a number times n a lottery, the chance single ticket in the lott Please enter a number people n a raffle, the chance Please enter a percenta	e and Numeracy I a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up even? between 0 to 1000 in the box. e of winning a \$500 prize is 1%. What is your best guess of how many people would win the prize if 1,000 people each buy tery? between 0 to 1000 in the box.

Product knowledge

Have you heard of the following:

	Yes	No
Bank/credit union transaction acounts	0	0
Bonds	0	0
Shares (Stocks)	0	0
Private health insurance	0	0
Life insurance policies	0	0
Superannuation accounts	0	0
Account-based (or allocated) pension	0	0
Lifetime annuity	0	0
Fixed term annuity	0	0
Aged care insurance	0	0

<<

Regarding a lifetime annuity, which of the following statements are always true?

Select all that apply.

- It is a type of life insurance product
- As a purchaser, you exchange a lump sum for regular income payments
- $\hfill\square$ Income from this product lasts your whole life regardless of how long you live
- $\hfill\square$ The estate receives a lump sum payment when the purchaser dies
- Purchasing this product results in regular income payments at interest rates higher than an equivalent term deposit

Regarding aged care insurance, which of the following statements are always true?

Select all that apply.

- As a purchaser, you pay a single/regular premium in exchange for benefits that help you cover (or reduce) the cost of long-term aged care or support expenses
- $\hfill\square$ The insurance covers costs of residential care only
- ☐ The premium of the insurance is higher if you are older
- There is a chance that you will not be able to purchase aged care insurance if you have difficulties with one or more activities of daily living (such as bathing, eating, and dressing)

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With regular premium payments, you may not get your payments back or receive any benefits if you surrender your insurance by discontinuing payment of the regular premiums

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 Yes No Do not know Which of the following statements I've not thought about what sa I've checked out my current si I've a firm idea of what I need I've a firm idea of what I need 	vings I will need wings position a for retirement an	for retirement	bout the finan	cial aspects of re		
 Do not know Vhich of the following statements I've not thought about what sa I've checked out my current sa I've a firm idea of what I need I've a firm idea of what I need 	vings I will need wings position a for retirement an	for retirement	bout the finan	cial aspects of re		
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 I've checked out my current so I've a firm idea of what I need I've a firm idea of what I need I've a firm idea of what I need 	avings position an for retirement an				irement?	
 I've a firm idea of what I need I've a firm idea of what I need I've a firm idea of what I need or many households, overall spectrum 	for retirement an	nd started to think				
 I've a firm idea of what I need or many households, overall specified 			about what I w	ill need for retirem	nt	
or many households, overall spe	for retirement an	d I'm not on track	to reach my sa	vings goal		
		d I'm on track to r	each my saving	s goal		
			on retirement.	Please indicate b	low what your e	experience has been (if you
 My household had (or expects) 	to have) no cha	nge in spending a	t retirement			
 My household has spent (or w 						
 My household has spent (or w 	ill spend) less af	ter retirement that	hefore			
~~						
						>>
						*
						>
						»
ow clear do you think the questi		-	Masthe	Campitable		>
	ons in this surv Sometimes clear	ey are? Sometimes confusing	Mostly	Completely confusing		>
	Sometimes	Sometimes				»

Online Appendix B Financing long-term care in Australia

In most cases, long-term care is referred to as "aged care" in Australia. The 2016 Census identified just over 3.6 million Australians aged 65 or above, which represented 15.3% of the population. About one-fifth of this group needed help with one or more ADLs (CEPAR, 2014).

Similar to the US and the UK, the publicly financed aged-care system in Australia is means tested (Department of Health, Australian Government, 2019a). This system compares with the tax-funded schemes popular in Nordic countries and social insurance in other OECD countries. Unlike the US, but similar to the UK (Dilnot, 2011), there is no private market for long-term care insurance in Australia. Subject to approval from an eligibility assessment authority as required by the Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT), people who need care either in their own home or in a residential care facility receive financial support from the Australian government. The amount of support is determined by means-testing rules, which are integrated with the means-tested public pension (the Age Pension).¹ In aggregate, the Australian government, 2019) and are projected to increase to 1.7% of GDP in 2019-20 (The Treasury, Australian Government, 2015). However, the total costs of aged care includes these public expenditures, out-of-pocket private expenditures, and costs associated with informal care. Costs differ depending on whether the individual receives care in their own home or in a residential facility.

People who receive care in their own home are required to pay a basic daily fee, a means-tested care fee, and fees for any additional services that are not covered by their care package (e.g., haircuts at home). The basic daily fee was set at 17.5% of the single Age Pension until 30 June 2019 and is now set between 15.68% and 17.5% depending on the consumer's home care package level.² The means-tested care fee is subject to an income test. There is an Income Free Area which excludes a certain amount of annual income from the income test in home care fees. This corresponds to yearly income less than A\$27,463.80 for singles and combined yearly income less than A\$42,588.00 for couples from September 2019. Individuals who earn below this amount (typically full pensioners) do not need to pay any care fees, with all costs paid by the government. The amount of income-tested fees is limited by a A\$5,550.90 annual cap for people with income below A\$53,060.80 and A\$11,101.81 for income above this amount. The costs of additional services that are not covered by the home-care package are out-of-pocket.

¹All amounts and means testing rules are for September 2019 (see Department of Health, Australian Government, 2019b). Thresholds are indexed and adjusted twice per year, with new rates published by the government in March and September of each year.

 $^{^2\}mathrm{From}$ 1 September 2019, this fee corresponds to between A9.52 and A10.63 per day.

People who receive care in a residential facility are required to pay a basic daily fee, a means-tested care fee, an accommodation payment, and fees for any additional services. The basic daily fee is 85%of the single basic rate of age pension. From September 2019, this fee corresponded to A\$51.63 per day. Both the care fee and accommodation payment are means tested by income and assets with the value of family home included in the assets test (up to a capped amount) unless the home is occupied by a spouse or dependent children. Combined, these corresponded to A\$168,351 in September 2019. The results of both tests are used to determine the amount of the care fee and the accommodation payment payable by care users. Similar to home-care users, an annual cap applies to the means-tested care fees for residential care. The annual cap is A\$27,463.80 of the amount paid in means-tested care fees. The means-test rules apply to the accommodation payment such that age pensioners will have their accommodation costs paid in full or in part by the Australian government. Other people will need to pay the accommodation price they negotiate with their aged-care facility. The accommodation can be paid as a daily accommodation payment (DAP) or a refundable accommodation deposit (RAD). The maximum RAD that can be charged without prior approval of the Aged Care Pricing Commissioner is A\$550,000. The cost of additional services — such as more food options, daily newspapers, and access to discretionary services such as podiatry — are out-of-pocket.

On top of these provisions, the system also provides a lifetime stop-loss scheme on the amount of care fees paid out-of-pocket, although individuals are still liable to pay the daily fees, the accommodation payment, and fees for any additional services. There is a lifetime cap, amounting to A\$66,610.90 as of September 2019. Individuals are not required to pay more than this amount for means-tested care fees (both for home care and residential care) in their lifetime.

The Australian government also provides support to informal care givers through a Carer Allowance (a supplement to cover some costs of caring) and a Carer Payment (for those unable to work as a result of caring). Around a quarter of a million Australians aged 65 or above receive informal care from those who received a Carer Payment. In total, these cost the government an additional A\$7 billion that is estimated to grow annually at a rate of over 6% in real terms over the next 20 years (National Commission of Audit, Australian Government, 2014).

Online Appendix C Wealth group assignment

Table C1: Categorization of wealth groups

The table reports four wealth groups based on participants' self-reported net wealth and corresponding assigned hypothetical retirement savings. Net wealth equals total assets less total liabilities, excluding the family home and its mortgage.

Net wealth	Wealth group	Hypothetical retirement savings
Less than A\$100,000	1	A\$50,000
A $100,000$ to less than A $250,000$	2	A\$175,000
A $$250,000$ to less than A $$500,000$	3	A\$375,000
A\$500,000 or higher	4	A\$1,000,000

Online Appendix D Financial product pricing

We priced the life annuity and the long-term care income product at actuarially fair value that was based on gender and a risk-free, real interest rate of 3%. We took both the mortality probabilities and health transition probabilities for pricing the life annuity and the long-term care income product from estimates by Brown and Warshawsky (2013), who use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 1998 (Wave 4) to 2008 (Wave 9). Brown and Warshawsky (2013) estimate the transition probabilities of a continuous-time Markov Chain of 11 health states, including death.³ We use the first four states to describe the current health of survey participants (see Table D1). The remaining seven states (those with more than one limitation or death), together with the first four describe how participants' health evolves over time. The health transition probabilities are gender- and age-dependent. We use these estimated health transition probabilities to price the life annuity and the long-term care income product.⁴ Because the hypothetical scenario in the experiment asked people to make the decisions as if they were 65, every one of the same gender faced the same price for the long-term care income product.⁵

Table D1: Classification of health states

The table explains the classification of health states (1 - 4). Heart problems refer to heart attack, coronary heart disease, angina, congestive heart failure, or other heart problems. Lung disease refers to chronic lung diseases like chronic bronchitis and emphysema.

Health state	History of major illness	Self-reported health	Disability status
1	None	Good to Excellent	0 ADL
2	None	Poor to Fair	0 ADL
	None	All	1 ADL
3	Heart problems or diabetes,	All	0-1 ADL
	but not both		
4	Heart problems and diabetes,	All	0-1 ADL
	or lung disease, or stroke		

 3 This actuarial health transition model is similar to the one developed by Robinson (1996), which is widely-used in the literature (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007, 2008) as well as by insurance companies, regulators, and government agencies.

⁵The long-term care income product is not priced according to a purchaser's current health, because the differences in actuarially fair prices across health states are small (Brown and Warshawsky, 2013).

⁴We note that the health transitions are estimated from US data while the survey is fielded to a sample of Australians. This is because there is no available Australian data to estimate a similar multi-state health transition model in retirement. For comparison, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) estimate that the probability of using long-term care for a 65 year-old American male (female) is 40 (54)%, while the probability of requiring care for a 65 year-old Australian male (female) is 48 (68)% according to the Productivity Commission (2011).

Online Appendix E Other covariates

In this section, we describe how we construct the control variables displayed in Table 5 but not discussed in the body of the paper.

E.1 Measures for utility parameters

The extent to which individuals are willing to purchase insurance against long-term care risk is likely to depend on their risk attitudes. Following Dohmen et al. (2011), we measure risk attitudes by asking participants to rate their willingness to take risks (WTR) in the financial context⁶ on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates not willing to take any risks and 10 indicates fully prepared to take risks.⁷

We also include a variable *Patience* as a proxy for time preference. Using a similar question to willingness to take risks, participants reported their level of patience on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating very impatient and 10 indicating very patient.

Recent studies show that the marginal utility of consumption might be health contingent. However, it is not clear whether it is higher or lower in poor health states (Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Ameriks et al., 2015; Finkelstein et al., 2013). To control for this, we measure the utility of consumption in bad health relative to that in good health using a survey question that is similar to the risk attitude question. We describe two persons – person A who 'prefers to spend as much as possible in good health and as little as possible in bad health' and person B who prefers the opposite. We asked participants to assess whether they are generally like person A or person B, on a scale from 0 (being like person A) to 10 (being like person B). This allows us to create the variable *Utility in bad health* as a proxy for the level of marginal utility of consumption in long-term care states relative to non-long-term care states.

There is no consensus in the literature about how (non-strategic) bequest motives affect the demand for long-term care insurance. On the one hand, a traditional view is that bequest motives increase the demand for long-term care insurance for two reasons (Pauly, 1990). First, they reduce the attractiveness of spending down wealth to receive means-tested publicly financed care. Second, long-term care insurance

⁶In the survey, we also asked risk attitudes in general. The correlation between the two measures of risk attitudes is 0.787. Being a female, older, and poorer relates to a higher risk aversion under both measures. Following Dohmen et al. (2011), we test the ability of both measures in predicting smoking and purchasing private health insurance using a horse race. However, both measures are not significant in predicting smoking and purchasing private health insurance behavior. We choose to use risk attitude in financial context as it relates more closely to our experimental tasks.

⁷Although the survey questions used to measure risk attitudes are not incentive compatible, earlier studies have shown its behavioral validity in predicting economic decisions in many contexts such as holding stocks and smoking (Dohmen et al., 2011).

reduces the exposure of the level of bequests to the risk of expensive long-term care costs. On the other hand, Lockwood (2014) shows that bequest motives decrease the demand for long-term care insurance, because the existence of bequest motives reduces the opportunity costs of holding precautionary savings to self-insure against long-term care risk. To measure the strength of bequest motives, we asked participants to rate the chance of leaving a \$100,000 inheritance (*Chance of \$100K bequest*) to their children (i.e., excluding any inheritance to their spouses) on a scale from 0 ('almost no chance') to 10 ('practically certain').⁸

Demand for long-term care insurance is influenced by its product design (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007; Ameriks et al., 2018). Therefore, the demand for the long-term care income product may also be influenced by an individual's preference over the type of long-term care insurance. As the long-term care income product is an income-indemnity policy, its demand may be lower if an individual prefers an expense-reimbursement policy. To take this into account, we elicited the preferences of participants over these two types of long-term care insurance in Q9 while keeping the costs and benefits of the policies the same. We construct a binary variable *Prefer reimbursement* coded as 1 if expense-reimbursement is preferred by the participant and 0 otherwise.

E.2 Individual capability and knowledge about retirement financial products

Bateman et al. (2018) show that financial literacy, numeracy, and knowledge about retirement financial products are important factors in explaining individuals' choices of retirement benefits. Agnew et al. (2008) find that individuals with high financial literacy are more likely to self-insure against longevity risk in an annuity choice experiment. Our experimental survey uses the standard financial literacy questions (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011) and numeracy questions (Lipkus et al., 2001). Both measures consist of three questions. We include them in our analysis by constructing the variables *No. of mistakes in N*, the number of mistakes in the financial literacy and numeracy questions, respectively.

To measure knowledge about retirement financial products, we construct a continuous variable *Earnings from recall quiz* to control for participants' understanding of the three products introduced in the survey. In addition, we measure knowledge of commercial financial products in general, as well as specific knowledge of life annuities and long-term care insurance. We create a self-reported variable *General product knowledge* as the number of products the participant reported as having heard of out of ten real

⁸Following the HRS, we also asked the chance of leaving any and \$10,000 inheritance in the survey. After an analysis on these three measures, we use the \$100,000 measure because the heterogeneity in the responses is larger.

world financial products. Another two variables, *Knowledge of life annuity* and *Knowledge of long-term care insurance*, measure the proportion of correct answers to two questions testing the detailed knowledge of commercial life annuity products and long-term care insurance policies respectively. Furthermore, we construct a binary variable *No private health insurance* for participants who had not purchased private health insurance. This is to control for the possibility that people who have private health insurance have more knowledge about long-term care insurance.

E.3 Retirement planning

We also include several variables for retirement planning, since people who have actually made financial plans may be subject to the status quo effect (Kahneman et al., 1991), tending to stick with their realworld plans in the experimental tasks. This may reduce the demand for the long-term care income product (which is not offered in the real world), while both the life annuity and the investment account are actual and available product choices for retirement benefits.

We create a binary variable *Intend to retire before 65* taking a value of 1 if it was the case for the participant and as 0 otherwise. Another binary variable *Financial planning for retirement* is also included, which is coded as 1 if the participant had given at least some thought about the financial aspects of retirement and as 0 otherwise. A continuous variable *Retirement spending change* is also created to measure the projected percentage change (or the experience of change for retired participants) of consumption upon retirement.

Online Appendix F Other determinants of demand for the long-term care income product

Analysis in Section 4 focuses on the influence of long-term care risk factors and availability of informal care on the demand for the long-term care income product as well as those variables selected using LASSO in the reduced model. In this section, we discuss the effects of other categories of covariates in the full model. Online Appendix E describes how we construct these covariates. Table F1 in reports the effects of these variables on the demand for the long-term care income product when the level of survival-contingent income is fixed. Table F2 focuses the effects when participants are able to choose the level of survival-contingent income.

Regarding measures of utility parameters, results in Table F1 show that willingness to take risk in a financial context has an inverse-U shape effect on the demand for the long-term care income product. This inverse-U shape relationship is found for both the probability of purchasing and the purchased amount of long-term care (health)-contingent income. Thus for people with low risk aversion, the less willing they are to take risk the higher their demand for the long-term care income product. For people with high risk aversion, the less willing they are to take risk the lower the demand for the long-term care income product. The turning point is around 5 on the scale from 0 to 10.

Theory predicts that lower willingness to take risk should lead to a higher demand for insurance, ceteris paribus. However, Clarke (2016) shows theoretically that when insurance benefits are imperfectly correlated with the purchaser's net loss, demand for the insurance is low for very risk averse individuals. This is due to basis risk, the insurance could both worsen the worst possible outcome (suffer a loss without adequate benefits) and improve the best possible outcome (no loss but receive benefits). Giné and Yang (2009) and Cole et al. (2013) find empirical evidence supporting this argument in the market for wealth index insurance, where the insurance benefits depend on a wealth index rather than the actual losses of the purchaser. This is similar to our case: as a flexible long-term care insurance, benefits of the long-term care income product depend on the disability status of the insured, rather than the costs of long-term care (thus an imperfect correlation).

However, when individuals are able to choose the amount of survival-contingent income (Table F2), we find willingness to take risk does not explain the preferences for health-contingent income against survival-contingent income. The likely reason for this is that the demand for the long-term care income product is measured relative to the demand for life annuities which is also affected by willingness to take risk. In this case, the reasons for the inverse-U shape relationship do not hold.

We also find that utility in bad health does not affect the demand for the long-term care income product. Moreover, we find that strength of bequest motives significantly reduces the probability of purchasing the long-term care income product and has a negative (but not significant) impact on the purchased amount of health-contingent income. Note that despite statistical significance, the variable is not economically significant. The estimated average partial effect of the bequest motive suggests that a one percentage point increase in the chance of leaving a \$100,000 bequest decreases the chance of purchasing long-term care insurance by less than 0.1 percentage point. Consistent with Brown and Finkelstein (2007) and Ameriks et al. (2018), we also find a strong negative impact of preferring an expense-reimbursement long-term care insurance on the demand for the long-term care income product, suggesting that demand for long-term care insurance is influenced by its product design. This is not apparent in the preferences for health-contingent income against survival-contingent income, because the negative impact of preferring an expense-reimbursement long-term care insurance also reduces the demand for life annuities (as they are also an income product).

We observe that in general participants with better financial literacy, numeracy, and knowledge about retirement financial products have a lower demand for the long-term care income product. This implies that they are more capable and likely to self-insure against long-term care risk using the investment account, which is consistent with the finding in Agnew et al. (2008). The most important factors are numeracy and recall quiz earnings, which show a significant and negative impact on the demand for the long-term care income product in the full models reported in both Tables F1 and F2. These factors are also found to be the important factors in explaining individuals' choices of retirement benefits in Bateman et al. (2018). Finally, we find retirement planning has little impact on the demand for the long-term care income product.

Table F1: Determinants of demand for the long-term care income product given income streams (full model)

The table reports the estimated coefficients for random effects probit models in columns (1), (2), and (3) and for random effects OLS models in columns (4), (5), and (6). The dependent variable for columns (1), (2), and (3) is a binary variable that equals one if a participant chose to purchase the long-term care income product in Q1-Q4 and zero otherwise. The dependent variable for columns (4), (5), and (6) is the natural logarithm of the amount of annual health-contingent income chosen by participants who chose to purchase the long-term care income product in Q1-Q4. A reduced model comprising a subset of variables is reported in Table 3 of the paper. $+\infty$ indicates that the associated independent variables perfectly predicts the purchase of the long-term care income product. Robust standard errors (Huber-White) are shown in parentheses. Asterisks for σ_{ν} indicate significance of the random effects that are derived from likelihood ratio tests (for columns (1) (2) (3)) and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (for column (4) (5) (6)). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Dependent variable:	Purchase lor	ng-term care in	come product	Log (annua	l health-contin	gent income)
	Sample (1)	Male (2)	$\stackrel{\text{Female}}{(3)}$	Sample (4)		$\stackrel{\text{Female}}{(6)}$
Objective measures of exposure to long-term of	care risk					
Female	0.001			-0.459***		
٨	(0.008)	0.001	0.000	(0.077)	0.010	0.010
Age	-0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.013	-0.018	-0.018
Health state: base case $= 1$	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.018)
$\frac{1}{2}$	-0.007	-0.067	0.028^{*}	0.073	0.134	0.077
	(0.018)	(0.055)	(0.016)	(0.133)	(0.163)	(0.198)
3	0.001	-0.015	0.017	0.005	0.021	-0.040
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.095)	(0.115)	(0.158)
4	[0.003]	0.001	0.012	0.122	-0.040	0.434***
	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.111)	(0.155)	(0.157)
Current smoker	-0.006	0.003	-0.014	-0.297***	-0.206	-0.423**
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.105)	(0.129)	(0.170)
Received care	-0.012	-0.063	0.021	0.142	-0.045	0.299
	(0.023)	(0.062)	(0.019)	(0.144)	(0.201)	(0.192)
Subjective indicators of exposure to long-term		0.000*	0.000	0.004	0.000*	0.004
Subjective life expectancy	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.002^{*}	-0.000	0.004	0.009^{*}	-0.004
Chance of needing homecare: base case $=$ a		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Lower than the average a	0.007	-0.004	0.009	-0.032	0.003	-0.130
Lower than the average	(0.001)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.104)	(0.131)	(0.185)
Higher than the average	-0.019	-0.109	0.015	-0.203	-0.121	-0.161
ingher that the average	(0.037)	(0.107)	(0.030)	(0.179)	(0.224)	(0.319)
Chance of needing residential care: base cas		(01-01)	(0.000)	(01210)	(**====)	(01010)
Lower than the average	-0.025*	-0.056**	-0.015	-0.039	-0.207	0.176
Ū.	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.101)	(0.129)	(0.177)
Higher than the average	0.015^{**}	$+\infty^{***}$	0.026* [*]	0.441***	0.465^{**}	0.097
	(0.006)	(n.a)	(0.012)	(0.169)	(0.188)	(0.339)
Awareness of long-term care risk						
Financial planning for long-term care: base						
Have set aside money but may need help	0.025**	0.058**	0.022	0.245***	0.388***	0.194
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.121)
Expect to rely on government	0.012	0.034	0.022	-0.026	0.102	-0.127
Cana muaridan	$(0.016) \\ -0.005$	$(0.035) \\ 0.021$	$(0.026) \\ -0.021$	$(0.138) \\ -0.077$	$(0.163) \\ -0.108$	(0.244) - 0.043
Care provider	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.081)	(0.108)	(0.118)
Availability of informal care and home owner		(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.107)	(0.116)
Source of some (low) care: base case = no i						
Informal care only	-0.002	-0.012	0.006	-0.202*	-0.374**	-0.004
J	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.116)	(0.154)	(0.173)
Informal care and other sources	0.006	0.037	-0.010	-0.246**	-0.225	-0.181
	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.115)	(0.163)	(0.168)
Source of extensive (high) care: base case =			· - /	x - /	()	<pre> /</pre>
Informal care only	0.016	0.052^{*}	-0.011	0.230^{**}	0.208	0.366^{**}
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.110)	(0.141)	(0.174)
Informal care and other sources	0.012	0.034	0.006	0.265^{***}	0.078^{\prime}	0.411***
	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.099)	(0.137)	(0.144)
Non-partnered	0.009^{\prime}	0.043^{*}	0.002	-0.034	-0.035	0.010^{\prime}
	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.092)	(0.133)	(0.127)
Number of children	0.001	-0.001	0.003	0.030	-0.046	0.108***
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.034)
					continued	on next page

Dependent variable:	Purchase lor	Purchase long-term care income product			Log(annual health-contingent income)		
	Sample (1)	Male (2)	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Female} \\ (3) \end{array}$	Sample (4)		Female (6)	
Non-homeowner	-0.013	0.015	-0.049*	-0.038	0.060	-0.215	
leasures of utility parameters	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.103)	(0.121)	(0.169)	
Willingness to take risk (WTR)	0.017^{***}	0.013	0.026**	0.126^{**}	0.056	0.164**	
0	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.075)	
WTR^2	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.003**	-0.012**	-0.005	-0.015*	
Patience	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
ratience	(0.000) (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.024)	
Utility in bad health	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.018	-0.018	
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.027)	
Chance of \$100K bequest	-0.000^{**}	-0.000	-0.001^{**}	-0.001	0.001	-0.003^{*}	
Prefer reimbursement	(0.000) - 0.018^{**}	(0.000) -0.021	(0.000) - 0.025^*	(0.001) - 0.275^{***}	(0.001) - 0.350^{***}	(0.001) - 0.209^*	
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.075)	(0.100)	(0.113)	
dividual capability and knowledge about re	tiremènt financa		· · · ·	· /	· · · ·		
No. of mistakes in Financial literacy	0.013**	0.016	0.026**	0.115***	0.108*	0.105*	
No. of mistakes in Numeracy	(0.006) 0.011^{**}	$(0.014) \\ 0.013$	$(0.012) \\ 0.012$	(0.044) 0.102^{***}	$(0.062) \\ 0.083$	(0.061) 0.127^{**}	
to, or mistards in runnerady	$(0.001)^{0.011}$	(0.013)	(0.012) (0.008)	$(0.102^{+0.0})$	(0.083)	(0.127^{44}) (0.053)	
Earnings from recall quiz	-0.011***	-0.023***	-0.007	-0.083***	-0.065*	-0.107**	
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.037)	
General product knowledge	0.006*	0.013*	0.004	-0.007	0.005	-0.011	
Knowladza on life annuity	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.045)	
Knowledge on life annuity	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.018 (0.030)	0.008 (0.041)	0.058 (0.047)	
Knowledge on long-term care insurance	-0.005*	-0.016**	-0.000	-0.022	-0.043	-0.024	
0 0	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.041)	
No private health insurance	0.004	0.000	0.007	0.035	0.037	-0.007	
etirement planning	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.079)	(0.103)	(0.123)	
Intend to retire before 65	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Financial planning for retirement	-0.008	-0.013	-0.015	-0.075	-0.058	-0.095	
Retirement spending change	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.090)	(0.118)	$(0.140) \\ 0.001$	
Retirement spending change	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001^{**} (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.003^{*} (0.002)	0.004^{**} (0.002)	(0.001)	
emographics and other controls	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Not born in Australia	0.003	0.007	-0.003	0.027	0.118	-0.056	
De ale alem de anna en ale anna	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.083)	(0.120)	(0.118)	
Bachelor degree or above	-0.004 (0.008)	0.026 (0.021)	-0.030^{*} (0.017)	-0.040 (0.081)	(0.010) (0.108)	-0.091 (0.123)	
Work status: base case $=$ full time	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.081)	(0.108)	(0.123)	
Part time	0.003	-0.006	0.012	-0.152	-0.062	-0.132	
	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.107)	(0.146)	(0.161)	
Unemployed/not in labour force	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.146 (0.100)	-0.131 (0.128)	-0.044 (0.159)	
Retired	-0.003	(0.023) -0.018	(0.020) -0.012	-0.298**	(0.128) -0.010	-0.483^{**}	
	(0.014)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.128)	(0.186)	(0.179)	
Household gross income	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.001	
Weelth means here ease 1	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Wealth group: base case = 1 2	0.001	0.011	-0.012	1.120***	1.113***	1.125***	
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.100)	(0.136)	(0.151)	
3	0.015	0.035	0.014	1.807***	1.737***	1.846^{**}	
4	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.018) -0.000	(0.110) 2.371^{***}	(0.151) 2.230^{***}	(0.157) 2.538^{**}	
Т	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.035)	(0.022)	(0.123)	(0.166)	2.538^{**} (0.179)	
Level of Annuitization: base case $= 0\%$	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.022)	(0.120)		(0.113)	
25%	0.001	-0.002	0.006	-0.127***	-0.081***	-0.175**	
F 0.07	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.028)	
50%	-0.006	-0.011	-0.006	-0.426^{***}	-0.359^{***}	-0.497**	
75%	(0.004) - 0.015^{***}	(0.009) - 0.031^{***}	(0.008) -0.013	(0.028) -1.003***	(0.041) - 0.860^{***}	(0.038) -1.150**	
1070	(0.005)	(0.031^{++++})	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.049)	
N	()	(/	. ,	(/	· /	()	
N Log likelihood	$4032 \\ -983.712$	$1932 \\ -494.137$	$1960 \\ -463.635$	3443	1753	1690	
R^2 (overall)				0.508	0.504	0.525	

continued on next page

	Tabl	e F1 – contir	ued				
Dependent variable:	Purchase lor	Purchase long-term care income product			Log(annual health-contingent income)		
	Sample (1)	Male (2)	$\stackrel{\text{Female}}{(3)}$	Sample (4)	Male (5)	Female (6)	
σ_{ν}	2.675***	2.612***	2.462***	1.057***	1.018***	1.086***	

Table F2: Determinants of the optimal mix of income streams (full results)

The table displays estimates of coefficients from an OLS regression of a participant's preferred ratio of healthcontingent income to survival-contingent income. The data for test estimation comes from Q6 of the choice task. A selected part of results in this table is reported in the paper (See Table 4). Robust standard errors (Huber-White) are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Dependent variable:	health-continge	nt income / survival	val-contingent incon	
		Male (2)	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Female} \\ (3) \end{array}$	
Dejective measures of exposure to long-term co	are risk			
Female	-1.392***			
	(0.432)			
Age	-0.086	-0.121	-0.037	
TT 1/1 / / 1 1	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.064)	
Health state: base case = 1	0.001	0.049	0.461	
2	$\begin{array}{c} 0.091 \\ (0.584) \end{array}$	(0.042)	0.461	
3	-0.212	$(0.999) \\ 0.115$	$(0.511) \\ -0.377$	
0	(0.509)	(0.738)	(0.604)	
4	0.701	0.564	0.819	
	(0.667)	(1.082)	(0.596)	
Current smoker	-0.505	-1.498**	0.359	
	(0.408)	(0.631)	(0.535)	
Received care	-0.449	-0.699	-0.283	
	(0.760)	(1.141)	(0.544)	
ubjective indicators of exposure to long-term				
Subjective life expectancy	0.007	0.029	-0.012	
Change of modium have	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.027)	
Chance of needing homecare: base case = av		0.901	0.000	
Lower than the average	$\begin{array}{c} 0.251 \\ (0.468) \end{array}$	0.381	-0.299	
Higher than the average		(0.748)	(0.457)	
ingher than the average	-0.499 (0.676)	0.921 (1.180)	-1.946^{**}	
Chance of needing residential care: base case		(1.100)	(0.908)	
Lower than the average	-0.647	-1.374**	0.301	
	(0.413)	(0.669)	(0.395)	
Higher than the average	2.264**	3.188**	0.507	
88-	(1.054)	(1.529)	(1.000)	
wareness of long-term care risk	(1.001)	(1.020)	(1.000)	
Financial planning for long-term care: base of	case = do not kn	ow needs and costs		
Have set aside money but may need help	0.387	0.552	0.433	
	(0.336)	(0.594)	(0.396)	
Expect to rely on government	-0.534	-0.533	-0.525	
~	(0.369)	(0.625)	(0.493)	
Care provider	0.277	-0.285	1.067^{**}	
	(0.382)	(0.615)	(0.453)	
Retirement planning	0.000	0.009	0.000	
Intend to retire before 65	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003	-0.003	
vailability of informal care and home owners		(0.009)	(0.003)	
Source of some (low) care: base case = no fa				
Informal care only	-0.883*	-0.397	-1.385***	
	(0.496)	(0.912)	(0.483)	
Informal care and other sources	-0.299	0.503	-1.099**	
	(0.571)	(1.061)	(0.474)	
Source of extensive (high) care: base case $=$				
Informal care only	2.120***	2.312**	1.841***	
~	(0.595)	(0.982)	(0.711)	
Informal care and other sources	0.607	-0.437	0.876^{*}	
	(0.513)	(0.959)	(0.465)	
Non-partnered	0.472	0.949	-0.043	
	(0.457)	(0.809)	(0.379)	
Number of children	0.089	0.077	0.094	
	(0.118)	(0.211)	(0.126)	
Non-homeowner	0.158	1.014	-0.699	
	(0.501)	(0.860)	(0.429)	
<i>leasures of utility parameters</i>			. /	
Willingness to take risk (WTR)	0.110	0.205	0.246	
9	(0.200)	(0.325)	(0.280)	
WTR^2	-0.013	-0.015	-0.030	

continued on next page

Dependent variable:	health-continge	ent income / survival	-contingent income
	Sample (1)	Male (2)	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Female} \\ (3) \end{array}$
	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.031)
Patience	0.076	0.207*	-0.060
	(0.065)	(0.109)	(0.060)
Utility in bad health	[0.053]	0.156	-0.053
	(0.105)	(0.174)	(0.115)
Chance of \$100K bequest	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)
Prefer reimbursement	-0.021	0.313	-0.270
Individual capability and knowledge about re	(0.413)	(0.693)	(0.382)
No. of mistakes in Financial literacy	0.260	0.280	0.149
ite. of mistakes in i manetar interacy	(0.254)	(0.443)	(0.290)
No. of mistakes in Numeracy	0.601***	0.675**	0.525^{**}
iter of mistanes in italiferacy	(0.203)	(0.321)	(0.223)
Earnings from recall quiz	-0.344***	-0.648***	-0.088
8	(0.124)	(0.218)	(0.123)
General product knowledge	0.252	0.399*	0.016
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	(0.158)	(0.221)	(0.210)
Knowledge on life annuity	-0.166	-0.269	-0.002
	(0.162)	(0.290)	(0.155)
Knowledge on long-term care insurance	-0.139	-0.175	-0.135
	(0.115)	(0.162)	(0.152)
No private health insurance	0.153	0.187	0.335
	(0.403)	(0.611)	(0.459)
Retirement planning			
Intend to retire before 65	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Financial planning for retirement	-0.046	0.254	-0.297
Patinement anonding abongo	(0.382)	(0.653)	(0.430)
Retirement spending change	0.007	0.005	0.006
Demographics and other controls	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Not born in Australia	0.590	0.800	0.253
	(0.524)	(0.958)	(0.414)
Bachelor degree or above	0.190	0.559	-0.280
	(0.447)	(0.837)	(0.450)
Work status: base case $=$ full time			
Part time	-0.701	-0.596	-0.672
	(0.618)	(1.008)	(0.792)
Unemployed/not in labour force	-0.896	-0.925	-0.943
	(0.609)	(0.905)	(0.788)
Retired	-1.132	-0.748	-1.633*
	(0.692)	(1.221)	(0.854)
Household gross income	0.001	0.004	-0.003
TT 7 1-1 1 1	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Wealth group: base case = 1	1.240***	1 400***	0.011*
2	(0.271)	1.402^{***}	0.611^{*}
3	(0.271) 2.958^{***}	(0.500) 3.669^{***}	$(0.345) \\ 2.222^{***}$
0	(0.387)	(0.718)	(0.452)
4	(0.387) 5.474^{***}	6.950***	(0.452) 3.891^{***}
÷	(0.737)	(1.142)	(0.838)
Constant	3.888	2.630	3.742
~	(3.407)	(5.866)	(4.070)
37	()	· · · ·	()
N P ²	1008	518	490
R^2	0.183	0.226	0.209

Table F2 – continued

Table F3: Regression of participants' responses to the withdrawal of the long-term care income product (full results)

The table reports estimation of the multinomial logit model of the probability that participants decrease (case 1), do not change (base case), or increase (case 2) annuitization when the long-term care income insurance product is withdrawn. The data for the estimation comes from Q7 of the choice task. The sample includes participants who chose partial annuitization in the presence of the long-term care income product in Q7 of the choice task. Independent variables that are significance at 5% level for at least one column are reported Table 5 of the paper. Robust standard errors (Huber-White) are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Base outcome: No change on annuitization	Decrease by 25%	Increase by 25%
-	(1)	(2)
Objective measures of exposure to long-term co		
Female	-0.067	-0.171
	(0.290)	(0.321)
Age	-0.041	0.004
0	(0.048)	(0.054)
Health state: base case $= 1$	()	()
2	0.621	0.413
	(0.513)	(0.543)
3	-0.006	-0.034
-	(0.359)	(0.402)
4	-1.072**	0.030
-	(0.478)	(0.443)
Current smoker	-0.556	-0.298
Current smoker		
	(0.398)	(0.459)
Received care	-0.420	-0.100
	(0.644)	(0.637)
Subjective indicators of exposure to long-term		
Subjective life expectancy	-0.014	-0.016
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Chance of needing homecare: base case $=$ av	erage	· · /
Lower than the average	-0.454	-0.375
Ũ	(0.405)	(0.445)
Higher than the average	0.935	0.817
88-	(0.821)	(0.815)
Chance of needing residential care: base case		(0.010)
Lower than the average	1.074***	0.687
Lower than the average		
TT: 1 (1 (1	(0.405)	(0.442)
Higher than the average	-0.590	0.523
	(0.881)	(0.849)
Awareness of long-term care risk	1 . 1	1 1 (
Financial planning for long-term care: base c		
Have set aside money but may need help	-0.195	-0.683**
	(0.284)	(0.317)
Expect to rely on government	-0.794	-0.023
	(0.580)	(0.642)
Care provider	$0.052^{'}$	0.597^{*}
I Contraction of the second seco	(0.303)	(0.329)
Availability of informal care and home owners		(0.020)
Source of some (low) care: base case = no in		
Informal care only		0.949
mormai care omy	-0.628	-0.248
Informal care and the second	(0.453)	(0.496)
Informal care and other sources	-0.852*	-0.931*
~	(0.446)	(0.499)
Source of extensive (high) care: base case $=$ ne	o informal care	
Informal care only	0.247	-0.174
	(0.451)	(0.515)
Informal care and other sources	0.274	0.298
	(0.357)	(0.410)
Non-partnered	-0.156	0.355
The partition of	(0.365)	(0.403)
Number of children	· · · · ·	
number of children	0.123	0.100
NT h	(0.113)	(0.128)
Non-homeowner	0.452	-0.134
	(0.399)	(0.486)
Measures of utility parameters		
Willingness to take risk (WTR)	0.014	0.114^{*}
-	(0.053)	(0.060)
		ed on next page

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Table F3 – cor	Decrease by	Increase by
Base outcome: No change on annuitization	25%	25%
	(1)	(2)
Patience	0.025	-0.069
Theilites in head health	(0.054)	(0.060)
Utility in bad health	$\begin{array}{c} 0.071 \\ (0.063) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \\ (0.071) \end{array}$
Chance of \$100K bequest	0.003	-0.000
chance of \$1001 bequest	(0.004)	(0.004)
Prefer reimbursement	0.260	-0.547*
	(0.270)	(0.314)
ndividual capability and knowledge about reti		
No. of mistakes in Financial literacy	-0.025	0.382^{*}
No. of mistakes in Numeracy	(0.188)	(0.206)
no. of mistakes in numeracy	$\begin{array}{c} 0.096 \\ (0.134) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.156) \end{array}$
Earnings from recall quiz	0.047	0.085
Lando Hom room quin	(0.090)	(0.099)
General product knowledge	0.118	-0.131
	(0.116)	(0.116)
Knowledge on life annuity	-0.154	0.070
	(0.118)	(0.129)
Knowledge on long-term care insurance	0.042	0.168
No privato hoolth incurrence	(0.097)	(0.107)
No private health insurance	-0.547^{*}	-0.031
etirement planning	(0.306)	(0.337)
Intend to retire before 65	-0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Financial planning for retirement	$0.598^{'}$	ì.016**
	(0.406)	(0.516)
Retirement spending change	-0.011*	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)
emographics and other controls Not born in Australia	0.002	0 119
Not Dorn in Australia	-0.083	-0.113
Bachelor degree or above	$(0.311) \\ 0.060$	$(0.350) \\ -0.423$
Bachelor degree of above	(0.290)	(0.336)
Work status: base case $=$ full time	((0.000)
Part time	-0.566	-0.556
	(0.390)	(0.456)
Unemployed/not in labour force	-0.033	0.129
Detined	(0.347)	(0.390)
Retired	0.219	-0.082
Household gross income	$(0.452) \\ 0.002$	$(0.549) \\ 0.000$
Torgenoid gross meome	(0.002)	(0.000)
Wealth group: base case $= 1$	(0.000)	(0.000)
2	-1.154***	0.317
	(0.435)	(0.570)
3	-2.818***	-0.092
4	(0.486)	(0.585)
4	-2.533^{***}	-0.065
Constant	$(0.474) \\ 1.582$	$(0.595) \\ -1.420$
Constant	(3.066)	(3.498)
A 7	· /	()
N Log likelihood		0.964 .000
Jog IIRCIIIIOOU	440	.000

Table F3 – continued

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